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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this paper is to discuss exchange rate policies in Botswana from 
1976 to 1994. It is also an attempt to find out how Botswana has responded to 
exogenous shocks and whether such responses could be used in the future when 
shocks recur. The paper contends that Botswana's record in responding to shocks has 
been impressive. This is not to say that previous policy actions in response to shocks 
would be adequate when shocks occur again. Experience shows that it is difficult to 




Exchange rate policy remains a crucial component of macroeconomic policy in any 
country. Today it is one of the most widely debated economic policy subjects, and 
one in which a consensus is hard to achieve. This is an indication of the complex 
nature of the relationship between exchange rate management on the one hand, and 
other domestic policies on the other. 
Exchange rate management has many dimensions and can be viewed from different 
perspectives. However, there are essentially two broad categories: one dealing with 
macroeconomic issues while the other put emphasis on microeconomic variables. The 
exponents of what Guitan (1994) calls the macroeconomic focus emphasise the 
importance of establishing a clear and credible anchor to achieve domestic price 
stability. They argue that it imposes a discipline on monetary authorities to implement 
appropriate financial policies so as to reduce inflation (see Kahn, 1992). In contrast, 
those who focus on the microeconomic dimension of the exchange rate stress the 
importance of maintaining international competitiveness of the economy. "The 
argument points accurately to the need in open economies to keep a viable, sound 
balance of payments position, a need to be and remain competitive or, in other words, 
to pursue ·an exchange rate policy geared to a real variable ... these two different 
perspectives or angles are modern versions of the relative weight given in the 
classical potential conflict between domestic and foreign conditions.,." (Guitan 
1994:14). 
However, in contrast to many developing countries (which frequently experienced 
balance of payments crises), policy makers in Botswana have had little n,eed to use 
the exchange rate exclusively for balance of payments purposes given the record of 
impressive levels of foreign exchange reserves. However, this does not mean the 
exchange rate has no role to play. Botswana is a relatively small and open economy, 
with a high dependence on mineral exports which have been responsible for high rates 
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of economic growth for the past 25 years of independence. However, the dramatic 
slowdown of economic growth in the past two years as echoed by the Bank of 
Botswana in its 1993 Annual Report communicates the message that a clear and 
coherent strategy of diversification is now an urgent need. Obviously such a strategy 
would entail dfversification away from mineral to non-traditional exports. Crucial to 
the success of any diversification strategy would invariably require the use of 
appropriate trade and exchange rate policies and the extent to which these two policies 
would influence international competitiveness of manufacturing exports in both 
regional and international markets. Therefore, the availability of massive foreign 
exchange reserves does not in anyway render exchange rate policy obsolete. 
However, one major problem facing Botswana is inflation, with Botswana's rate of 
inflation exceeding that of South Africa for the first time in a decade. Under these 
circumstances, any attempt to devalue the domestic currency with the aim of 
increasing international competitiveness which will stimulate performance of exporting 
and import-substituting sectors will result in an increase in inflation. For a long time, 
the exchange rate has been used as an anti-inflation tool, considering the impotency 
of pure monetary policies, i.e., inflation in Botswana depends heavily on South 
Africa's inflation and Rand/Pula rate. We shall return to this important point later 
when we discuss the South African experience which bears a few similarities to our 
situation. 
According to Atta et al., "[e]xchange rate has been used to achieve both price 
stability and international competitiveness objectives, with the emphasis varying 
depending upon the prevailing economic circumstances and priorities at the time" . 
(1993:4). As some of the literature will show, Botswana i~ not alone in trying to 
resolve the inherent conflict between achieving price stability and international 
competitiveness. Kiguel sums up the objectives of the exchange rate policy as, 
"Exchange rate policy is usually driven by two different, and many times conflicting 
objectives: first, to support a competitive real exchange rate, and second, to serve as 
nominal anchor for low inflation. The former objective is generally pursued to 
support the expansion of the exportable and import substituting sectors, and as a way 
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to ensure a strong position in the balance of payments. The latter objective is 
important to the extent that low inflation and macroeconomic stability create a 
favourable environment for long term growth" (Kiguel, 1992: 1). 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
This study aims: 
i to provide review of the theoretical background relating to the exchange rate policy, 
ii to briefly discuss different exchange rate policy options and their implications in 
developing countries in general and Botswana, in particular, 
iii to provide a detailed analysis of the exchange rate policy since 1976, 
iv to investigate how Botswana has responded to exogenous shocks experienced, and 
v1 to draw conclusions for future exchange rate policy. 
1.2 Structure of the Study 
In order to meet the above objectives, the study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 
' " 
one is the introduction. Chapter two evaluates some of the alternative exchange rate 
policy choices in developing countries. C~apter three discusses the exchange rate 
policies in Botswana from 1976 to 1994. Exogenous shocks as well ;:is policy 




2 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OPTIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
There is no single answer to the question of the appropriate exchange rate policy for 
developing countries. It will depend on the circumstances in which the country finds 
itself, the nature of the economy and the relative weights that policy makers assign 
to different objectives. However, the choice of a particular exchange rate regime is 
not free of any conflict especially in developing ·countries, where the two main 
objectives of achieving price stability and maintaining international competitiveness 
are not easily reconciled. 
In the discussion that follows, we will look at the merits and some of the problems 
of an independent floating exchange rate regime and the alternative, fixed or "anchor" 
regimes, i.e., nominal fixed exchange rate rule or constant real exchange rate rule. 
Other exchange rate systems will be mentioned in passing. These are discussed in 
sections 2.1 to 2.5 while section 2.6 discusses the general experience of developing 
countries in their use of exchange rate regimes and section 2. 7 concludes. 
2.2 Nominal Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
A nominal fixed exchange rate. rule entails the adoption of a single currency peg or 
multiple currency peg. In the former, the domestic currency (e.g. Pula) is pegged to 
that of its major trading partner (e.g. US$) but the US$ is floating against other 
currencies while the latter involves pegging the currency to a trade-weighted basket 
of currencies. The maintenance of a peg with trading partners restricts domestic 
monetary policy to be in line with trading partner monetary policies. If the objective 
is to control inflation, then a constant nominal exchange rate would reduce the 
imported inflation impact on the price index as long as the country's inflation is 
higher than that of its trading partners. This objective will not be met if inflation is 
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persistently higher in the domestic economy and instead this policy will result in an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which will impact negatively on the export and 
import-substituting sectors. 
2.2.1 Financial Discipline 
Advocates of a fixed exchange rate rule argue that one major advantage is that the 
rule imposes financial discipline on monetary authorities so as to restore price 
stability and reduce inflation (Aghevli et al., 1991). 
However, financial discipline would not be binding in the circumstances where the 
Central Bank resorts to external borrowing in order to replenish reserves and support 
the exchange rate. Creditors will subsequently refuse to extend credit if they realise 
that authorities want to defend the exchange rate indefinitely. Once creditors perceive 
authorities as financially insolvent, then it is difficult to impose financial discipline. 
Another important aspect of maintaining financial discipline is the extent to which the 
country will maintain the rate of inflation equal to its major trading partners. In this 
case, a fixed exchange rate would set a limit on the future expenditure available to 
the public sector. It is important to note that a fixed exchange rate will impose 
discipline on the authorities only if the exchange rate is not adjusted. 
2.2.2 Credibility 
Credibility can be built up by maintaining a fixed exchange rate permanently. This 
could be achieved by joining the currency union under which a group of countries 
adopts a common currency. However, establishing credibility can prove to be an 
enormous task especially in countries that have been plagued by a series of . 
devaluations. Once markets realise that devaluation is an option, then there is a loss 
of credibility of the peg. Sometimes devaluation could be used in response to 
permanent shocks. Once this option is not available, authorities are forced to rely 
entirely on financial policy. To the extent that a fixed exchange rate may provide 
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certainty to producers of tradable goods, it may undermine the credibility of the 
government in its attempt to resort to restrictive demand policies, thus making it 
difficult to lower inflation without the risk of output loss. A country with a long 
record of financial stability could successfully implement a "once-and-for- all" 
devaluation. In a case where a country is struggling with inflation it is difficult to fix 
the exchange rate after an initial devaluation unless it is prepared to accept a period 
of recession. 
2.2.3 Pegging to a Single Currency 
An advantage of a single currency peg as opposed to a multi-currency peg is that a 
country may achieve low inflation if it pegs to a currency of major trading partner 
with a low inflation. Another advantage is since fluctuations of exchange rate are 
reduced between a developing country and a developed one, then trade is likely to 
increase between the two countries because of less uncertainties. This is important 
because uncertainties caused by frequent fluctuations of the exchange rate will damage 
the confidence of exporters. 
However, the objective of low inflation may not be achieved if the major currency 
to which the domestic currency is pegged experiences large real exchange rate 
movements against other major currencies that are also important trading partners for 
this developing country. 
Another disadvantage of a single currency peg is that while market participants 
dealing in dollars are exposed to risk, those dealing in other major currencies could 
cover themselves through forward transactions between the dollar and other major 
currencies. However, this can only be achieved in a situation where financial markets 
are developed--a situation which does not exist in many developing countries. 
Another disadvantage is that movements of the exchange rate do not necessarily 
reflect the actual developments of balance of payments of the developing country but 
simply those of the partner country. However, the question as to whether there will 
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be a need for less or more reserves will depend on the nature of the relationship 
emanating from the equilibrium induced changes in the country's exchange rate 
against the rest of the world. . 
Related to this problem is that since fluctuations of the exchange rate are exogenous 
and independent of government policy, there is a possibility of a conflict between 
these fluctuations on one hand, and domestic policies on the other. An example is 
when a developing country chooses to simulate import-substituting and export sectors 
and employment. Any appreciation of the domestic currency will hurt the 
manufacturing sector leading to a loss in output and unemployment. Alternatively, 
while depreciation may result in an increase in exports, the high cost of imports may 
lead to further increases in inflation. 
2.2.4 Pegging to a Basket 
A trade-weighted basket entails.pegging to a basket of currencies where the effective 
exchange rate is the average of market rates against currencies of trading partners. 
It is usually calculated using any of the three indices: export-weighted index, import-
weighted and/or bilateral trade index. The export (import)-weighted index is the 
average of country's exchange rate against other currencies, relative to a base year, 
weighted by the share of each trading partner in exports (imports) of each country 
concerned. The bilateral trade index is the average of the two indices mentioned 
above, weighted by shares of exports and imports. 
The reason why the import-weighted index is often used is that in developing 
countries exports are often homogeneous with their prices (normally quoted in US 
dollars) determined in international markets hence changes in exchange rates of major 
trading partners are not likely to affect those of a developing country that they are 
trading. However, the exchange rate affects the prices of imports hence the import 
price index is subject to changes in the source of supply of its imports or by changes 
of exchange rates which provide these imports. 
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Another advantage of an import-weighted basket peg is that it reduces price instability 
caused by changes in foreign exchange rates. This is in contrast to a single currency 
peg which often causes instability of import prices. 
A trade-weighted basket has the advantage of offsetting fluctuations of domestic 
currency against other currencies. Therefore, a trade-weighted basket implies that all 
market participants would bear the same exchange rate risk. 
However, a trade-weighted basket may be unattractive to investors if they feel that 
the value of the domestic currency is unpredictable owing to the manipulation of the 
basket. Owing to these problems', certain countries use Special Drawing Right (SDR)1 
as an external link. The rate is determined and published on a daily basis depending 
on the exchange rates. However, the SDR does not reflect movements in the effective 
exchange rate as closely as an import-weighted basket. Only when the divergence 
between the two is not too big, then it is beneficial to peg to SDR. 
2.3 Flexible Exchange Rates 
Although a trade-weighted basket could offset the impact of exchange rate fluctuations 
among major currencies or the effective rate of developing countries, its major 
limitation ·is that it does not counter other influences emanating from balance of 
payments shocks from these countries. Independent floating provides a mechanism for 
determining the equilibrium exchange rate and serve to insulate domestic monetary 
system from external shocks. · 
When large structural changes are occurring and desired, the collapse of exchange 
rate may limit the government in accommodating these changes. This situation would 
· not occur if the authorities pursue fiscal and monetary policies taking into account 
their domestic policy objectives under flexible exchange rates. 
l The Special Drawing Right is the unit of account of the IMF constituting of fixed proportions of jive 
major currencies, viz. the US dollar, the deutschemark, the Japanese yen, the UK pound and the 
French franc . 
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There is also a view that once t~e country adopts a flexible exchange rate policy then 
it will avoid distortions in trade and capital flows. The danger with this view is, 
however, the fact that exchange rate fluctuations are sensitive especially in respect of 
capital flows and hence exchange rates should adjust to these external shocks. In so 
far as foreign investors perceive exchange rate flexibility as reducing the willingness 
of a country to pursue restrained domestic monetary policies, there may be harmful 
effect on capital inflows. To the extent that there is a high international capital 
mobility and high substitutability, flexible exchange rates could be better insulators 
than fixed rates against other shocks. However, Goldstein (1980) has argued that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy may not be achieved if real wages are "sticky". 
However, the performance of floating exchange rate regime has not been satisfactory. 
Contrary to the earlier view that the flexible exchange rate regime will solve 
problems of Bretton Woods as P.redicted, the experiences of the last decade have been 
disappointing. It caused disruptions and undesirable side-effects such as misalignments 
of the real exchange rates (see Dunn: 1983, Balassa: 1986 and Khan: 1986). 
Another major problem facing countries with floating regimes is the choice of the 
appropriate intervention policies once a floating system is adopted. Intervention will 
involve the use of international reserves either by adding foreign exchange to 
reserves, selling from reserves to the market, or taking a position in the forward 
market with the principal objective of changing or defending the nominal exchange 
rate. It is suggested that intervention in the early stages of exchange rate reform 
should be discouraged. Sterilization may require intervention to prevent the exchange 
rate from appreciating thereby undermining competitiveness. However, Quirk has 
argued that it would be " ... necessary to adjust fiscal policies by reducing credit to 
government in order to sterilize the threat that foreign exchange purchases for 
international reserves pose for domestic liquidity. Sterilization by contracting credit 
to the private sector not only raises interest rates but accelerates and perpetuates 
capital inflows; it therefore tends to be ineffective beyond the very short run" (Quirk, 
1994:144) 
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2.4 Constant Real Exchange Rate Rule 
A constant real exchange rate rule entails the frequent adjustment of the nominal 
exchange rate to offset inflation differentials. Such a rule, unlike fluctuating real 
exchange rate imparts certainty to manufacturing exporters so that they have some 
information on the movements of the relative prices thus avoiding production 
decisions based on incorrect expectations. One major problem of flexible exchange 
rate, as argued above, is the uncertainty faced by domestic producers when the 
exchange rate changes dramatically over time. As a result, these dramatic movements 
of exchange rates will damage the confidence of exporters. 
The fact that developing countries are mostly exporting primary products like 
diamonds, gold, etc implies that any exchange rate policy that cushions the volatile 
prices of these commodities would m~an that manufacturing exporters are faced with 
fluctuating real exchange rate and therefore changing international competitiveness. 
Studies by Balassa and Williamson (1987) have shown that the success of export-
oriented growth strategies of Taiwan and Korea was aided by the maintenance of 
stable real exchange rates. 
One major problem of a constant real exchange rate rule relates to the measurement 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) (i.e., the relative price of tractable to 
non-tractable goods that is consistent with the simultaneous attainment of internal and 
external equilibrium for a long time). This rule is based on the assumption that the 
economy is not exposed to permanent shocks, i.e., the ERER is constant over time. 
Another problem of the purchasing power parity is the choice of a base year. If it is 
wrong, this will not allow for any changes once the ERER deviates from the actual 
rate. Therefore, the difficulty of estimation of the ERER may lead to a wrong 
estimation hence the target may not be a correct one. 
Apart from the problem of identifying the appropriate real exchange rate, another 
problem has been posed by Edwards (1988). It is questioned why there are changes 
in international competitiveness over time yet there is no underlying overvaluation or 
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undervaluation. Edwards (1988) argues that there is a fundamental equilibrium real 
exchange rate in the economy and this rate is determined by the fundamentals2 and 
these fundamentals can change. As long as fundamentals remain constant, the ERER 
will also remain constant. If there is a change in any of the fundamentals, the ERER 
will change too. It is also questioned how to respond when there is a change in the 
ERER as a result of a change in one of the fundamentals. A permanent change in one 
of the fundamentals could change the ERER hence a policy of maintaining the actual 
real exchange rate at a constant level could result in real exchange rate misalignment 
(i.e., departures of the actual real exchange rate from the equilibrium rate are 
sustained). 
Related to the problem above is identifying whether shocks are temporary or 
permanent. It is argued that temporary fluctuations · do not require any policy 
intervention while permanent fluctuations need adjustment. For example, any 
worsening of international prices (terms of trade) will lead to a change in the ERER 
because prices of tractable goods should change to maintain equilibrium. If the actual 
real exchange rate is not adjusted to reflect this change in the ERER, there will be 
misalignment of the real exchange rate. However, as Kahn has noted, " ... to assess 
to what extent the real exchange rate will be affected is often impossible, particularly 
in the face of shocks" (Kahn, 1992:12). 
One of the major costs of exchange rate misalignment is real appreciation will result 
in a loss of international competitiveness, i.e., a real appreciation is a misalignment. 
To restore exchange rate equilibrium will require a drop in the domestic prices of 
non-tradeables. This is unlikely to be the case if prices and wages as well as exchange 
rates are fixed. Any correction of this problem will therefore result in an output cut 
precipitating unemployment. However, a nominal devaluation can be used to restore 
real exchange rate equilibrium without incurring the costs just mentioned. In fact, to 
2 These fundamentals can be divided into 2 groups: internal and external fundamentals. Internal 
fundamentals include international prices (i.e., terms of trade), international transfers (foreign aid) 
and world real interest rates. However, import tariffs, export taxes, exchange controls (capital 
account), composition of government expenditure (tradable & non-tradable goods) and technological 
changes are examples of external fundamentals. 
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the extent a devaluation will improve both the ·international competitiveness of a 
country and its. external position, this seems to be viable option. This will normally 
be the case when the devaluation takes place at a time when the real exchange rate 
is greatly overvalued and expansive monetary and fiscal policies are simultaneously 
discouraged. 
It would appear that while a constant real exchange rate could be used to off set the 
impact of high inflation from interfering with external competitiveness, this may not 
be. sufficient. As Dornbusch argues, maintaining a constant real exchange rate is only 
a " ... partial assurance of good exchange rate policy. Thinking must go beyond 
offsetting inflation differentials to look at the level of the real exchange rate that 
assures a comfortable external position". (Dornbusch, 1988: 103). 
The crawling peg system resulted in many countries experiencing a vicious cycle of 
high inflation which would require another round depreciation (to counter real 
exchange rate appreciation due to a rise in domestic prices) which then feeds through 
inflation. High inflation would ultimately cause severe macroeconomic dislocations. 
As Aghevli et al have noted, ·"[r]ecent literature and experience suggest that real 
exchange rate rules may also have disquieting implications for macroeconomic 
stability, notwithstanding their favourable effect on the external position. The 
adoption of a real exchange rate target, entails the pursuit of a real target with a 
nominal instrument, may leave a small economy without a nominal anchor for 
domestic prices. Consequently, shocks to domestic inflation may acquire a 
permanent character and, under some circumstances, lead to hyperinflation" (Aghevli 
et al., 1991:10). Using various models Adams and Gros (1988) have found that the 
monetary authorities may no longer be able to control inflation if they set the nominal 
exchange rate according to a real exchange rule and that, if the authorities do try to 
control inflation, they will tend to lose control of another variable. 
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2.5 Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries 
Developing countries have over time implemented a variety of exchange rate regimes 
which include among others fixed, flexible and crawling peg. As already mentioned, 
a fixed exchange rate regime, whether against a single peg such as the Rand, or 
basket of currencies, indicates the weight attached to the anti-inflation strategy. The 
primary purpose is a commitment to achieve price stability within the framework of 
sound macroeconomic policies. By contrast, however, a more flexible regime would 
put more emphasis on achieving international competitiveness through depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate. Whereas the nominal exchange rate responds to market 
forces in the case of flexible exchange rate regimes, frequent devaluations take place 
due to inappropriate macro policies in fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The findings of the above studies were corroborated in a study by Edwards (1989) 
who carried out a systematic analysis of the effectiveness of nominal devaluation, 
focusing on the sustained impact on the real exchange rate as an important indicator 
of effectiveness. According to him, the effectiveness of a nominal devaluation is 
measured by: 
effectiveness indexk = RERk/Ek where 
RERk the percentage change in the real exchange rate between the year prior 
to the devaluation and k years after devaluation (k = 1, 2, 3). · 
k 
the number of years of the devaluation in the observation period. 
the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate during the period. 
"This elasticity ... provides an index of the degree of erosion experienced by the real 
exchange rate during the three years after the devaluation. A value of one means that 
the nominal exchange rate adjustment has been fully transferred into one-to-one real 
' 
devaluation ... " (Edwards, 1989:255-259). The value of this ex post elasticity indicates 
at what percentage of the devaluation has been effective. 
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As Edwards has shown in the survey of 28 countries, " .. .in a number of countries 
nominal devaluation had successfully increased the level of the real exchange 
rate ... hence countries are force~ to devalue again" (Edwards, 1988:35). In the case 
where the exchange rate is overly-depreciated, prices of tractable goods start to rise 
and import prices will start to increase immediately. At the same time, wages start 
to rise on both tradable and non-tractable goods hence prices of domestic goods start 
rising rapidly. Under these circumstances, the real exchange rate will start to 
appreciate. Any attempt to devalue the currency will lead to the process repeating 
itself. In other words, there is an exchange rate spiral. The experience of Latin 
American countries that adopted a crawling peg system has shown that they failed 
consistently to implement appropriate policies to reduce inflation. 
Policies such as wage indexation which require the government to increase wages 
every time there is an increase in inflation can only help to exacerbate inflation. 
Experiences of Brazil where wage indexation would occur after every week meant 
that any attempt to control inflation under these circumstances would be a difficult 
task. This is confirmed by Edwards who has observed in the survey that, " ... countries 
that have a high (or complete) erosion of the effect of nominal devaluation within four 
years are those that accompanied the exchange rate adjustment with expansive 
domestic credit policies and large fiscal deficits or those that had wage indexation 
schemes in effect. The countries that experienced a small degree of erosion usually 
implemented consistent management policies to control the creation of domestic credit 
and greatly reduce the fiscal deficits" (Edwards, 1988:35). 
While most developed countries and some developing countries have adopted floating 
. or flexible exchange rate regimes, this has. not always been the case in most of the 
developing countries due to the thinness of the financial markets and other 
institutional features. However, the share of countries pegging to a basket of 
currencies rose sharply between 1977 and 1990. In contrast, pegging to the SDR has 
diminished (Barth, 1992). What made flexible exchange rate regimes quite popular 
. in recent years could be " ... a response to accelerating domestic inflation rates, which 
made necessary continuing currency depreciation in order to avoid a deterioration in 
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external competitiveness, and the uncertainties associated with fluctuations in the 
exchange rates of the major currencies" (Barth, 1992:39). 
2.6 Conclusion 
The conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries had over time required 
frequent adjustments owing to fluctuations in exchange rates of major currencies. 
Developing countries use different exchange rate policies depending on the prevailing 
circumstances and priorities ar the time (see Table 2.1). For example, those who 
advocate nominal fixed exchange rate rule argue that it imposes financial discipline 
on monetary authorities by maintaining price stability and reducing inflation (i.e., if 
the country pegs to a currency of major trading partner with low inflation). It is also 
argued that a constant real exchange rate rule imparts certainty to manufacturing 
exporters about information on movements of relative prices so as to avoid production 
• 
decisions based on false expectations. Again, if the monetary authorities feel that a 
country is exposed to capital flows of highest levels and want to protect the current 
account and domestic markets from these shocks, they may impose a dual exchange 
rate system. However, it can be effective if capital disturbances are transitory. This 
illustrates the difficulties in formulating a "one" exchange rate policy option 
throughout in the face of changing circumstances. 
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Table 2.1: Exchange Rate Regimes - Advantages and Disadvantages 
Regime Advantages 
1. Nominal Fixed Exchange Rate 
i. Single Peg a It imposes financial discipline on monetary 
authorities in order to restore price stability 
and reduce inflation. 
b Credibility easily built when there are less 
frequent devaluations. 
c Confidence in the developing country's 
currency may be enhanced if the country 
whose currency is being used for the peg is 
regarded as pursuing economic policies 
conducive to price stability. 
ii. Pegging to a Basket a It reduces price instability caused by 
changes in foreign exchange rates. 
b It minimises fluctuations of domestic 
currency against other currencies. 
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Disadvantages 
a Achieving low inflation is difficult when 
fluctuations to which the domestic currency 
is pegged occur frequently. 
b Since fluctuations are exogenous and 
therefore independent of government policy, 
the possibility of a conflict exists between 
those fluctuations on one hand and domestic 
policies, on the other. 
a Investors may feel that the domestic 
currency is less predictable owing to 
manipulation of the basket. 
2. Flexible Exchange Rates a It allows a more continuous adjustment of a High variability in the exchange rate due to 
the exchange rate to shifts in the demand the thinness of the market. 
for and supply of foreign exchange hence 
. ~ the difficulty of determining the appropriate b High variability in rates may affect capital 
. ··~ level of the rate under either a fixed regime inflows particularly if the investors associate 
·~i or a basket peg is avoided. exchange rate flexibility with the country's 
inability to follow restrained domestic 
b External balances are reflected in the monetary policies. 
exchange rate movements instead of reserve 
movements since the monetary base is not c Uncertainty faced by domestic producers 
affected by foreign exchange flows. when exchange rate changes dramatically 
ultimately damaging the confidence of 
exporters. 
3. Constant Real Exchange Rate Rule a It imparts certainty to manufacturing a It is based on the assumption that the 
exporters so that they have some economy is not exposed to permanent 
information on the movements of the shocks, i.e., the equilibrium exchange rate 
relative prices thus avoiding production is constant over time. 
decisions based on incorrect expectations. 
b Existence of fundamentals can cause 
changes in international competitiveness 
over time yet there are no changes in the 
real exchange rate. 
c The nominal exchange rate is depreciated 
(or appreciated) in line with inflation 
differentials between one country and its 
major trading partners thereby introducing 
an inflation bias in the economy. 
4. Dual Exchange Rates a It avoids transitory shocks in the capital a Once they are prolonged, they reflect 
account which would significantly affect the expectations about the viability of the 
exchange rate. commercial rate and distortions may result. 
b It therefore insulates exporters from capital b They are easily used for corrupt practices 
account based variations. and their administration is cumbersome. 
17 
CHAPTER THREE 
3 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN BOTSWANA 
3 .1 · Introduction 
Exchange rate policy in Botswana has been guided in the main by two objectives: 
firstly, to maintain macroeconomic stability given the country's vulnerability to 
exte1;Tial shocks notably, fluctuations on the diamond market and secondly, to support 
a competitive real exchange rate in order to expand the exportable and import 
substituting sectors. However, Botswana's high dependence on South Africa make it 
imperative to discuss South Africa's exchange rate policy. The chapter is divided into 
four sections. Section one gives a brief summary of South Africa's exchange rate 
policy from the early 1980's to 1994. Section two discusses the objectives of the 
exchange rate policy and some other important developments influencing the choice 
of these objectives. Section three looks at the measures implemented since Botswana 
attained its monetary independence to achieve the above objectives. The conclusion 
is in section four. 
3.2 South Africa's Exchange Rate Policy 
Before discussing Botswana's exchange rate policy it is necessary to look briefly at 
the South Africa's exchange rate policy because while it is the largest economy in 
Southern Africa, its conduct of the exchange rate regime is considered crucial because 
about 80% of Botswana's imports come from and/or through South Africa. 
Following the recommendation ·of the De Kock Commission, the fixed exchange rate 
policies of the 1970s gave way to market-determined flexible exchange rates. 
However, the objectives included among other things; protection of gold mining, 
stable balance of payments' position, promotion of exports and maintenance of price 
stability (Kahn, 1992). As already argued, these objectives often conflict with each 
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other and this conflict is exacerbated by different exogenous shocks which the 
economy may be exposed to. However, there are two interesting periods of study of 
South African exchange rate policy namely, the period between 1983 and 1988, and 
the period after 1988 up to 1994. Changes of exchange rate policy during these 
periods were closely examined by Kahn (1992). The primary objective during the 
period 1983-1988 was to protect the gold mining industry considering its importance 
in terms of employment and its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Kahn has observed that, "this policy was characterised by a downward bias in that the 
rand was allowed to depreciate when the dollar gold price was declining, whereas 
appreciations were resisted during periods of gold price increases" (Kahn, 1992:6). 
Similarly, Gidlow argued that "in recent years the prices of both platinum and gold 
have fallen in dollar terms, but the rand prices have increased .. .in other words, the 
floating rand has been helping to insulate these exporters from fluctuations in the 
dollar prices of these commodities ... the volatility in the rand may well be detrimental 
to numerous exporters in the manufacturing sectors whose operations are somewhat 
marginal in nature ... the onset of sanctions is likely to render the economy more 
dependent on fungible mineral exports like gold and platinum. The cushion provided 
to such industries by the floating rand could therefore assume even greater 
importance" (Gidlow, 1988: 15~). 
According to Kahn (1992) since 1988 there was a shift of focus of the exchange rate 
policy away from the protection of the mining industry to the maintenance of stable 
real exchange rate which will assure the manufacturing sector of international 
competitiveness. As a result, the change in policy has affected employment levels in 
the gold mining industry. However, it would appear that the interest of mining and · 
manufacturing sectors differ with respect to exchange rate policy. This situation is not 
only unique to South Africa but in Botswana as well where diamonds contribute the 
largest share of the country's exports. An increase in the price of diamonds will 
invariably led to an appreciation of the exchange rate which then impacts negatively 
on manufacturing. Apart from the objective of promoting export-oriented sectors, the 
exchange rate policy has important implications for the inflation. In this context, the 
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South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has openly stated that the primary objective is 
to protect the value of the rand. What is less clear is whether it is a real or nominal 
exchange rate. 
However, from 1989 onwards there has never been any explicit rule but instead the 
SARB seems to try to maintain stable real exchange rate and avoid excessive nominal 
excessive nominal depreciations (conflict with inflation control) (Kahn, 1992). 
3.3 Issues and Objectives of Exchange Rate Management in Botswana 
The Bank of Botswana was established in 1976 and the Pula was introduced as a legal 
tender currency to replace the South African rand. Prior to this, Botswana was a 
member of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) and this meant that Botswana did not 
have independent monetary and exchange rate policies. The attainment of independent 
monetary and exchange rate policies was important to the extent that South Africa's 
macroeconomic (including exchange rate) policy objectives were dominated by its 
own economic considerations, and not necessarily those of other members of the 
RMA, including Botswana. 
Exchange rate management is primarily directed at achieving two objectives. One of 
the objectives is to maintain macroeconomic stability given the country's vulnerability 
to external ·shocks. Another objective is to balance a trade-off between a higher rate 
of inflation and improved short-run competitiveness. Since the introduction of the 
Pula in 1976, the exchange rate has been used as an anti-inflation tool, while on some 
occasions it has been used to improve competitiveness in order to promote economic 
diversification and create employment. It has also been used (in the early years) as 
a redistributive tool (Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1985 and Gaolathe & Hudson, 
1989). The exchange rate is fixed against a basket of foreign currencies, reflecting 
the weights of both exports and imports. 
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3.3.1 Maintaining Macroeconomic Stability in the Face of Shocks 
Despite exposure to shocks, prudent fiscal policies and sound management have 
prevented Botswana from being burdened with persistent balance of payments 
problems. Since the early 1980s, Botswana has recorded surpluses on its balance of 
payments (see Table 3.1). As ·a result, in contrast to many developing countries, 
exchange rate policy in Botswana has not been driven by the need to reduce 
unsustainable balance of payments deficits and instead could be used to address 
economic management issues at a cautious pace. In addition, the build up of foreign 
exchange reserves meant that any balance of payments deficits could be absorbed with 
less economic dislocations in the long term. 
As discussed below, Botswana has faced several adverse balance of payments shocks, 
notably in 1981 and 1992 when the diamond market weakened and quotas were 
imposed. However, as we have noted, although macroeconomic balance was 
threatened by these shocks, each time the economy was able to return to a stable 
development course. Both fiscal, monetary as well as exchange rate policies all 
contributed to restore this macroeconomic stability. 
3.3.2 Balancing the Trade-off Between Inflation and Improved Short-run 
Competitiveness 
One way of fostering international competitiveness is to contain price increases in 
order to control costs. In Botswana, import prices denominated in Pula coming from 
South Africa play a significant role in determining the price levels of both consumer 
and producer goods. Imports, of which 80% come from South Africa, have a strong 
influence on tractable goods prices. Tradeable goods make up a dominant share (75%) 
of the consumer basket that comprises the Consumer Price Index (CPI), while the 
basket that constitutes the Producer Price Index (PPI) consists largely of traded 
goods. 
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Table 3.1 Balance of Payments Summary 
(P million) 
1980 1981 1982 
Balance on visible -45 -239 -123 
trade (adjusted) 
Balance on services -115 -48 -46 
Balance on goods and -160 -287 -169 
services 
Net transfers 99 116 120 
Balance on current -61 -171 -49 
account 
Balance on capital 120 91 94 
account 
Net errors and 13 19 14 
omissions 
Overall balance 72 -61 59 
Source: Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1994, pp. s50. 
1983 1984 1985 
28 122 445 
-163 -241 -364 
-135 -238 81 
137 132 170 
2 13 251 
105 144 239 
31 8 11 
.1::. 
138 165 501 
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
459 1322 813 1186 328 200 395 646 
-346 -501 -520 -742 -530 -512 -125 100 
113 821 293 444 -202 -312 270 746 
210 284 409 / 217 223 344 258 208 
323 1105 702 661 21 32 528 954 
207 -143 -67 356 434 676 599 223 
21 -26 62 146 123 56 -266 -196 
551 936 697 1163 578 766 861 980 
Although the impact of import prices is very strong on Botswana prices, the 
exchange rate can not be the sole policy instrument for controlling inflation. Firstly, 
this is because the share of imported tradeables in the CPI is 48 % . Secondly, because 
of lags in the price adjustment process and lack of competitiveness among producers, 
the inflation reducing effects of appreciating the Pula may not be fully passed on to 
Botswana consumers in the short to medium term. 
However, exchange rate policy may be used to achieve short term competitiveness. 
A devaluation of the Pula will have the effect of raising proceeds from Botswana's 
exports and at the same time, raise the Pula cost of imports. Although devaluations 
can make exports more competitive, they can trigger higher inflation, particularly if 
the devaluation is undertaken when inflation in South Africa is rising and credit is 
expanding in Botswana. For example, the Pula was devalued by 15% in January 
1985. During this time, the rate of inflation in Botswana had been declining from 
1, 13,4% in May 1983 to 5,4% in February 1985, mostly due to sustained Pula 
appreciation against the Rand. In contrast, South African rate of inflation had been 
rising from 9,8% in February 1984 to 14% when the Pula was devalued and rising 
even further to reach about 18% · in December 1986 (see Chart 111.3). The 
depreciation of the Pula against the Rand by 15% in January 1985 reversed the 
declining trend of the rate of inflation and by the end of the year, the rate had 
doubled. The drastic rise of inflation resulted in substantial real Pula appreciation 
wiping out international competitiveness that had been sought by the devaluation of 
the Pula previously (January 1985). Similarly, in 1991, a 53 devaluation of the Pula 
was undertaken when inflation was rising in both Botswana and South Africa, and 
credit was expanding rapidly in Botswana. As a result, there was an increase in the 
rate of inflation and subsequently, the Pula appreciated (in real terms). 
As already mentioned, exchange rate policy management entails striking a balance 
between the objectives of price stability on the one hand, and achieving international 
competitiveness by giving assurance to import-substituting and export-oriented 
sectors, on the other. This is complicated by the fact that the export sector is not 
homogenous and subject to different shocks. However, policy makers in Botswana 
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have been faced with these options as well since then, with varying emphasis · 
depending upon the prevailing economic circumstances and priorities at the time. 
3.3.3 The Run on the Rand: 1981-1985 
Rapid growth in 1980 had led to the overheating of the South Africa's economy due 
to the increase in gold price. TP,is coincided with the second oil price shock and the 
onset of world recession. There was surge in imports associated with the boom, 
which coupled with the increased cost of oil imports, led to a sharp deterioration in 
the country's trade balance and a significant weakening of the value of the Rand. 
There was a significant depreciation of the Rand against the US dollar by 36 % from 
1981 to the first half of 1982. At the same time, South African inflation rose from 
single to double digits, reaching about 173 at the beginning of 1982 (Kahn, 1992 
and Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1994). 
The unfavourable macroeconomic conditions prompted the authorities to adopt tight 
monetary policies resulting in Rand appreciation against the US dollar in the second 
half of 1982. However, this was short-lived. In 1983 the financial rand was 
abandoned and there was some appreciation: of the Rand against the US dollar in the 
same year. In 1984, there was. a significant drop of 35 % in the value of the Rand 
partly because of deteriorating balance of payments and the strengthening of the US 
dollar. The combined impact of the weakness in the gold market, drought, the debt 
standstill, sanctions and capital flight was borne mainly by the weakening Rand. The 
effect of these Rand movements on the Pula caused it to depreciate against the US 
dollar by 70% index points, or 563 in real terms (see Chart 111.1). 
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Chart 111.1 
US$1 PULA EXCHANGE RATE, CPI BASED 
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Since the bulk of Botswana's export earnings are denominated in US dollar and 
j 
other major international currencies, while imports are predominately denominated 
in Rand, the fall of the Rand relative to the US dollar meant that prices of imports 
fell relative to the prices of exports. This meant that Botswana's international 
competitiveness improved dramatically for quite sometime until South African 
inflation rose and caught up with the change in the exchange rate. 
The improvement in exports would have caused Botswana to experience a 
significant real appreciation of the Pula making diversification outside minerals 
increasingly difficult to sustain, as the non-mineral sector became internationally 
uncompetitive. However, there was a conscious decision to maintain a competitive 
exchange rate in order to promote development of import-competing industries and 
exports. This decision was taken because it was realised that the highly capital 
intensive mining sector would not provide enough employment and therefore it was 
essential to develop non-mining sectors such as manufacturing, business services 
and tourism. As shown below, the graph shows significant exchange rate 
devaluations. It is also telling us that between 1985 and 1990 the Pula appreciated in 
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A major concern, however, was not whether inflation in the two countries would 
rise, but rather, whether Botswana would manage to keep its rate of inflation below 
that of South Africa; thus maintaining Botswana's competitiveness relative to South 
Africa. However, Botswana was able to keep its rate of inflation lower than that of 
South Africa until 1992 (see Chart 111.3). 
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Chart ID.3 
BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICAN INFLATION 
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3.3.4 Trade with Zimbabwe 
While it is acknowledged that exchange rate policy support for non-traditional 
exports has been aimed primarily at maintaining stability in the Rand/Pula real 
~xchange rate, the Zimbabwean market also became an important destinati.on for 
non-traditional exports in the 1980s. Though the market was volatile, the real 
exchange rate against the Zimbabwean dollar remained reasonably stable until 1989, 
and Botswana producers were able to take advantage of the uncompetitive 
Zimbabwean situation by selling non-mineral products to that market. 
However, this windfall was temporary as Zimbabwean authorities undertook a 50% 
devaluation of its currency in 1991 as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. Cotton subsidies to textile producers were drastically cut in the same 
year. This put Botswana producers, whose growing exports were dependent on the 
Zimbabwean market, either for cheap cotton inputs or for a substantial share of 
their exports, at a disadvantage. As a result, several local firms were forced to 
reduce their production and/or close down altogether. 
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The large real appreciation of the Pula relative to the Zimbabwean dollar is an 
indication of the uncompetitive situation confronting Botswana producers in 
Zimbabwe after the latter undertoo' devaluation in 1991. It is noted that part of the 
devaluation was subsequently eroded by high inflation in that country. However, 
there were few discrete devaluations of the Zimbabwean dollar and as domestic 
inflationary pressures eased and domestic inflation slowed · down, some real 
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3.4 Implementation of Policy Options 
From 1976 onwards, a number of measures have been used to manage the exchange 
rate. The withdrawal from the RMA had increased the scope for pursuing 
independent macro-economic policies and exchange rate policy could now be geared 
towards the economic needs of Botswana rather than simply an extension of South 
Africa's economic performance, especially its balance of payments (see Box I). 
Initially both the Pula and the Rand were pegged to the US dollar. However, 
following the abandonment of the Rand/US dollar peg in January 1979 (when the 
Rand was allowed to float) on a· managed basis and the continued pegging of the Pula 
to the US dollar, there was uncertainty for firms which continued to engage in trade 
denominated in Rand. In June 1980 the US dollar/Pula peg was abandoned and the 
Pula was pegged to a trade-weighted basket consisting of the SDR and Rand, in equal 
proportions, reflecting the proportion of Rand based-transactions in Botswana's 
international trade and moderating the effects of fluctuations in the cross exchange 
rates between other currencies on the value of the Pula. 
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Introduction of the Pula. 
Pula pegged to US dollar 
at Pl = US$1.15 
5 % Pula appreciation 
Rand taken off US dollar 
and floated 
Pula taken off US dollar 
peg. Introduction of Pula 
basket consisting of SDR 
and Rand 
5 % Pula appreciation 
Steep drop in world 
gold price 
10% Pula devaluation 
5 % devaluation 
Rand weight in Pula 
basket adjusted 
15 % Pula devaluation 
Foreign debt standstill 
for South Africa and run 
on the Rand 
New Pula basket 
introduced 
5 % Pula appreciation 
5 % Pula devaluation 
5 % Pula devaluation 
Technical adjustment 
Source: Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1994. 
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Comments 
Rand pegged to US 
dollar at the same 
rate hence Pl = RI. 
Anti-inflation measure. 
Rand appreciation 
against the dollar as gold price rises 
Reduction of 







rises following Pula depreciation 
against the Rand. 
Rapid depreciation of theRand 
as RSA export earnings collapse. 
Part of stabilisation measures in response to 1981/82 
balance of payments crisis. 
Competitiveness measure following Rand collapse and 
rapid Pula appreciation against the Rand. 
To reduce drift of 
Pula from Rand. 
Additional competitiveness measure in response to rapid 
Pula appreciation against the Rand. 
Rapid depreciation 
of Pula against US 
dollar as Rand continues to deteriorate. 
Due to rapid Rand 





3.4.1 Choice of an Adjustable Peg System 
Several reasons prompted Botswana to choose an adjustable peg system for its exchange 
rate rather than to float. Some of these were: the peg served to reduce fluctuations in the 
effective exchange rate, whereas a float would have made the exchange rate susceptible 
to swings, given the thinness of the Pula3 market; owing to the size of the dividend that 
accrued from the diamond mines, a floating Pula would have had limited effectiveness 
in achieving equilibrium of supply and demand for foreign exchange at a level that could 
be considered consistent with Botswana's economic development and diversification 
objectives. Under these conditions, if all the foreign exchange earnings were supplied to 
the market, the Pula would hav~ appreciated to levels that would have made non-diamond 
domestic production internationally uncompetitive (Gaolathe & Hudson, 1989 and Bank 
of Botswana Annual Report, 1994). 
By adopting the exchange rate peg mechanism there was no need for a continuous flow 
equilibrium in the supply of, and demand for, foreign exchange. There was therefore a 
need to accumulate sufficient foreign exchange reserves to deal with the fluctuations that 
might arise in international trade and payments. The SDR was attractive because it 
enjoyed international status and was a relatively stable proxy for the major international 
currencies though its limitation was that it did not necessarily reflect Botswana's trade 
pattern. Since June 1980, the Pula has remained pegged to a basket of currencies whose 
composition has been changing over time, the most important being an increasing weight 
for the US dollar over and above its contribution to the SDR. However, the nominal 
external value of the ·Pula can change in two ways. Cross exchange rate movements 
involving other currencies will impact on the exchange rate of the Pula against those 
currencies. Another change could be changing the exchange rate of the Pula against all 
3 On the one hand, Botswana's export earnings are dominated by minerals, some of which are subject to 
large price fluctuations. On the other hand, however, the country's development programme is largely 
dominated by discrete infrastructural projects. The combination involves sizeable shifts in the supply of 
foreign exchange confronting timed sizeable shifts in the demand for foreign exchange. 
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of the currencies in the basket, or by changing the composition of the basket itself. 
3.4.2 Price Stability and Income Equality 
From 1976 until 1982 the objective of the exchange rate policy was to maintain price 
stability by reducing imported inflation hence a 5 % appreciation of the Pula against the 
Rand took place three times during the period. The first 5 % appreciation was in May 
1977. The objective of this appreciation was to reduce the impact of sharp price increase 
of imports from South Africa, and also to instil confidence in the domestic currency. 
According to the Bank of Botswana, the objective was " ... to stem the continued adverse 
effect of imported inflation especially among the low-income group, whose purchases 
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include a high proportion of imported goods" (Bank of Botswana, Annual Report, 
1980:15). Another 5% appreciation was effected on September 14th, 1979 and on 
September 7th, 1980, there was a further 5 % appreciation. The main objective of these 
revaluations was to maintain price stability and address income inequalities. 
However, it is doubtful whether these two objectives were met. For example, the Rand 
subsequently appreciated against the US dollar and the Pula by 2,5 % rendering the first 
objective obsolete. Empirical studies by Huda (1987) and Ncube (1992) found high 
explanatory power for South Africa's producer price index in the equation explaining 
Botswana's Consumer Price Index, but found the coefficient of the exchange rate of the 
Pula in terms of the Rand insignificant. However, because of the importance of imported 
goods in the production price index, the exchange rate plays a critical role. Ncube (1992) 
in his simple model of price behaviour in Botswana found that the exchange rate was not 
significant in explaining price behaviour in Botswana. However, given South African 
producer prices and the relative exchange rate between the Rand and the Pula, it would 
appear that South African producer price index has a significant impact on the movement 
of prices in Botswana. 
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Therefore, Ncube (1992) concludes that contrary to the traditional view that exchange 
rate policy has been effective in mitigating the impact of imported inflation, this has not 
been the case. He argues that while, " .. .it is true that imported inflation from South 
Africa plays a significant role on the domestic inflation .. .it appears a puzzie that the 
exchange rate remains a blunt instrument in curbing that influence" (Ncube, 1992:18). 
It would appear that the reason for this is that retail and wholesale traders in Botswana 
tend to be oligopolistic and not competitive and are reluctant to pass exchange rate 
benefits to consumers. In other words, the market is imperfect. Under these 
circumstances, any attempt t~ target the exchange rate to minimise the effects of 
imported inflation is bound to fail. 
The objective of anti-inflation policy was important given that South Africa's inflation 
was higher than that of Botswana for a decade until 1992. This is confirmed by the Bank 
of Botswana which has noted that, "the exchange rate management strategy has thus 
been, on the whole, supportive of the import-substitution sector and has also retained an 
anti-inflation bias all through ... " (Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1989:5). However, 
the Pula was devalued by 10 % for the first time in May 1982 as part of a package of 
measures in response to what was perceived as a balance of payments crisis following 
the imposition of quotas on diamond exports in 1981 (diamond exports fell from P123 
million in mid-1980 to P44 million a year later). There was also a need to change the 
focus of the exchange rate policy which had emphasised maintenance of price stability 
to that of stimulation of export~. The exchange rate policy was then used to encourage 
international competitiveness of import..:substituting and export sectors. The exchange rate 
of the Pula continued to be determined in relation to a trade-weighted basket of 
currencies. In 1984, the Rand and the US dollar moved sharply. In the same year, the 
Rand depreciated by 403 and 25 % against the US dollar and pound sterling, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the US dollar registered appreciations against both the 
deutschemark and the pound sterling by 15 % and 25 % , respectively. 
However, the devaluation of 1982 was considered inadequate because of the failure of 
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domestic producers to engage in import-competing a:nd non-traditional export activities. 
This resulted in a further 5 % devaluation on July 7th, 1984. The Bank of Botswana has 
noted that the main objective of the devaluation was to promote competitiveness of 
domestic producers, especially in the manufacturing sector. The second half of the year 
experienced a further decline of the Rand precipitating a 15 % devaluation on January 
9th, 1985. However, the 1985 debt crisis shock in South Africa led to the total collapse 
of the exchange rate of the Rand resulting in an effective increase in the price of gold. 
In other words, the Rand continued to weaken severely against major international 
currencies. The Pula fell against major currencies as well but rose against the Rand from 
Rl.07 to Rl.27 in 1984. Although the Pula again appreciated against the Rand in 1985; 
the real exchange rate was held fairly constant thereafter4 • 
3.4.3 Introduction of a new Basket 
Following the highly unstable ~arket conditions as evidenced by sharp fluctuations of the 
US dollar against major international currencies, the sharp decline in the value of the 
Rand and uncertainty in the future, a new basket5 with a reduction in the weight of the 
Rand in the Pula basket was established. At this juncture, it was·imperative to take a 
major decision hence a decision was taken to weaken the link between the Pula and the 
Rand, so as to reduce the impact of the anticipated inflationary upsurge in South Africa 
(following debt crisis shock) and to distance the Pula from what was increasingly 
perceived as a weak currency, so as not to damage the investment climate in Botswana. 
The US dollar continued to decline in 1986. The Rand benefitted significantly this time. 
However, there were no major changes between 1986 and 1988 with respect to the 
4 
5 
"In terms of competition with South Africa, for example, the Pula rose by 16% against the Rand end-
1983 to end-1987; the ratio of price increases in South Africa to price increases in Botswana over the 
same period was 22 percent, g(ving a fall in bilateral real exchange rate of 5 percent" (Harvey & Lewis, 
1990:245) 
For a detailed account of the review of the Pula basket, see an article on the subject in Bank of Botswana 
Bulletin, December, 1985. 
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exchange rate of the Pula against major currencies such as the US dollar and the 
deutschemark except modest appreciations and depreciations of 1 % at different intervals. 
This led to a fairly stable exchange rate against the Rand, although it resulted in 
substantial fluctuations against other major international currencies; for example, in 1987 
the Pula rose against the US dollar by 17 % yet depreciated against the pound sterling by 
about 8 % . However, due to high rising levels of inflation in South Africa (hence the fear 
that it will be exported to Botswana), the Pula was revalued by 5 % . As Bank of 
Botswana has observed, " .. -.the monetary authorities took the corrective measure of an 
upward adjustment of the Pula against the basket of currencies by 5 percent, with the 
basic objective of mitigating the impact of imported inflation" (Bank of Botswana Annual 
Report, 1989:38). Inflationary pressures remained strong throughout 1990, despite a 
decline in the rate of inflation in South Africa and some appreciation of the Pula against 
the Rand. However, inflation was lower at the time (in the 1980s) indicating that the 
exchange rate played a role to counter the impact of inflationary impact of South Africa. 
However, as the Bank of Botswana has noted, "the rapid appreciation of the Pula 
observed since the beginning of the year (1990), especially against the South African 
rand, became a matter of concern mainly because of its impact on the competitiveness 
of domestic industry" (Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1990:33). Furthermore, it was 
observed that the performance of export sector was quite disappointing, as total export 
earnings declined for the first time since 1981 by 3 percent. It would also appear that the 
view that inflation in Botswana was wholly imported seemed erroneous. Domestic 
pressures such as increasing government expenditure and high utility tariff charges were 
also contributing. As Ncube has found in his study, " ... authorities have been invariably 
targeting exchange rate in an effort to minimise the effects of imported inflation in the 
economy. The results show that this has not been the case. Other factors have also been 
shown to influence inflation significantly and these are income (wages) and tariff 
charges" (Ncube, 1992:18). Consequently, the Pula was devalued by 53 in August 1990. 
This raised import prices, and shifted some of the excess demand that had been 
previously been absorbed by imports back into the domestic market; but, inflationary 
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impact was relatively mild. Ho~ever, another devaluation was effected on September 7, 
1991. This had the effect of accelerating imported inflation, consequently driving 
domestic inflation to reach its peak of 17,7% in June 1992, exceeding South African 
inflation for the first time in a decade. 
High inflation in 1992 led to a rapid real appreciation of the Pula rendering any attempt 
to maintain international competitiveness as a result of two previous devaluations 
unsuccessful. The smaller devaluation in 1990 was, however, relatively successful, while 
the subsequent one in 1991 was not; any potential benefit from the devaluation in 1991 
was immediately eroded by the rapid increase of prices in 1992. In 1993, the rate of 
inflation began to stabilise, partly due to a reduction in imported inflation. This helped 
to stabilise the real exchange rate, and by 1994 attempts to secure real Pula exchange rate 
depreciation against the Rand proved successful, as both non-tractable and imported 
inflation dropped. At the end of 1994, the rate of inflation in Botswana was 9,8 % , which 
was below that of South Africa for the first time since 1992. 
As noted earlier, exchange rate management in Botswana was initially weighed in favour 
of maintaining price stability by mitigating the effects of imported inflation from South 
Africa. Recently, however, there has been a shift to commit the exchange rate towards 
giving assurance to domestic manufacturers so thflt they could compete in regional 
markets. However, it is argued that the two devaluations of 1990 and 1991 seemed to 
have contributed to a dramatic rise in inflation from 10,6 % in June 1990 to 173 in 
1991. 
3.5 Conclusion 
As argued earlier, exchange rate management has been influenced by two set of 
objectives: firstly, to maintain macroeconomic stability given the country's vulnerability 
to external shocks and secondly, to support a competitive real exchange rate in order to 
boost the import substituting sectors. The relative weight given to each objective 
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depended to a larger extent on the prevailing circumstances. Some important 
developments such as the run on the Rand between 1981 and 1985 caused the Pula to 
depreciate against the US dollar leading to an improvement in international 
competitiveness. Various measures such as the choice of an adjustable peg system in June 
1980, were prompted mainly by the realisation that a peg would reduce fluctuations in 




4 EXOGENOUS SHOCKS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
4.1 Introduction 
The late 1970's and early 1980's were painful years for non-oil exporting countries. A 
combination of exogenous shocks, such as balance of payments crisis, declining growth 
rates in developed countries, dramatic increases in world real interest rates on external 
borrowing and many more made management of these economies extremely difficult. 
Shocks are important because po developing country can isolate itself from the world 
economy. Therefore, developing countries are vulnerable to these shocks and coping with 
them can be an extremely painful process. The chapter is divided into five parts. The 
first part outlines the nature of the problem in reference to how adverse external shocks 
affect the developing countries. The second part discusses policy options available to a 
country that experiences adverse shocks and in particular, the real exchange rate policy 
response. The third part discusses the specific shocks experienced in Botswana and 
responses to these shocks. The fourth part mentions some of the lessons regarding policy 
responses to these shocks. The last part is the conclusion. 
4.2 Nature of the Problem 
At least four major changes have occurred in the world economy since 1970's. These 
were: the two major recessions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a sharp rise in oil 
prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80, the decline of the US dollar against major currencies in 
the 1970's and the rise in inflation and interest rates (Krugman, 1988). All these sharp 
swings (sometimes happening simultaneously) made policy making in developing 
countries extremely difficult. 
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In an economy that is small and producing non-traded goods, manufactures and primary 
commodities, a decline in terms of trade lowers factor costs and increases production of 
domestic manufactures and non-traded goods (Khan, 1986). Real inc9me as well as 
spending on these goods will ~all. Consequently both prices of manufactures and non-
traded goods fall in order to maintain equilibrium. Increasing foreign real interest rates 
reduces borrowing and spending. Investment is reduced and savings increase which 
implies that disposable income is reduced causing prices to fall, i.e., a real depreciation 
has occurred. In contrast, an inflow of capital from abroad would allow domestic 
residents to increase spending on all goods. 
When there is a decline in a country's earnings, for example, due to a fall in prices of 
a particular export good, a country has to choose between either adjusting its spending 
to match the lower real incomes, or alternatively maintaining its spending by drawing 
down foreign reserves (and possibly incurring additional debt) in order to finance a 
standard of living beyond the means allowed by the lower income level. However, the 
latter option is risky. If it turns out that the shock is not temporary, and adjustment 
continues to be postponed, th~n eventually foreign reserves run out and a balance of 
payments crisis subsequently follows. The magnitude of the crisis will depend on the 
duration of the shock, how soon foreign reserves are depleted, and how much foreign 
debt has been incurred. 
4.2.1 Export Shocks 
According to this thesis, the major source of export shocks to developing countries is the 
international business cycle. This takes place through changes in commodity prices. In 
the case of commodity prices, when the economies of developed countries grow rapidly, 
the demand for raw materials also increases leading to a rise in commodity prices. In 
~ontrast, recessions reduce commodity prices. Therefore, since developing countries are 
mostly net exporters of raw materials, recessions in developed countries invariably 
constitute an adverse export shock. 
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4.2.2 Exchange Rates 
Movements of exchange rates of developed countries can have adverse effects on the 
prices of exports and imports of developing countries. For example, if the US dollar 
appreciates against other major currencies, both the import and export prices of 
developing countries fall when measured in US dollars but rise when measured against 
major currencies. This situation arises when the US dollar rises resulting in the dollar 
import prices falling not as much as the dollar export prices. As a result, the terms of 
trade worsens in the developing countries. 
4.2.3 Interest Rates 
Interest rates constitute one of the major sources of shocks originating in the capital 
market. A rise in the interest rates raises the cost of the existing debt (if the cost is a 
floating rate which entails frequent adjustments taking into account recent world interest 
rates) through an increase in interest payments such as deterioration in terms of trade. 
The cost of increased interest payments could be met either by devaluation or increased 
borrowing. 
4.2.4 Constraints on Borrowing 
The increasing amount of foreign debt (as a result of increases in the cost of debt) has 
been a major source of adverse external shock to most developing countries. Some . 
countries have found it increasingly difficult to access new loans as foreign banks or 
major international financiers refuse to re-new or issue new loans to them. As a result 
of this, some countries are forced to reduce imports or their budget expenditure which 
is again a painful process and often has severe implications for long-term growth. 
40 
4.3 Policy Response to Exogenous Shocks 
Krugman (1988) identifies two reasons why exogenous shocks demand a policy response. 
Firstly, a fall in the receipts of domestic residents from abroad or an increase in their 
payments to foreigners leads to a drain on foreign exchange reserves. Since foreign 
reserves are limited, this requires some policy response to avoid an acceptably large 
depreciation of the currency. Secondly, an increase in interest payments on foreign debt 
will exacerbate government budget deficit if the government has borrowed internationally 
at flexible exchange rates. 
Broadly, policy makers are faced with at least two options to respond to these shocks. 
One such option is by financing and\or adjustment. Financing the balance of payments 
deficit resulting from an external -shock entails borrowing. This policy response is 
recommended if the shock is temporary: In contrast, if the shock is permanent it is 
advisable to resort to adjust~ent policies such as increasing exports and reducing 
imports. One major problem with regard to financing is that most developing countries 
have had difficulties to raise new loans due to the increasing burden of debt and 
commercial banks' refusal to lend them. Adjustment requires a set of packages, for 
example, a cut on the provision of social services and devaluation to be implemented by 
the borrowing country some of which lead to a lowering of standard of living. It is also 
difficult, however, to identify whether the shock is temporary or permanent. 
4.3.1 Exchange Rate Policy Response 
In recent years, a number of developing countries have experienced a series of external 
shocks that have had direct effects on their real exchange rates. Dramatic increases in 
world real interest rates on external borrowing made economic management in general 
and exchange rate management. in particular, a daunting task for-policy makers in these 
countries. Complicating these problems further were the inappropriate domestic policies 
such as expansionary demand policies together with fixed exchange rates resulting in 
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inflationary pressures and declining international· competitiveness. 
It is difficult to isolate exchange rate policy responses from other policies that are 
implemented simultaneously. Existing historical evidence seems to suggest that certain 
developing countries such as those in the southeast Asia, for example, Singapore· and 
Taiwan did fairly well in adjusting to external shocks. The real exchange rates in these 
countries was depreciated which then expanded their export share in the world markets .. 
Others, particularly African primary product exporters such as Zambia and Tanzania 
implemented exchange rate policies which resulted in real appreciation. Increased 
overappreciation was linked to external borrowing that obstructed adjustment in the 
exchange rate as the external financing of balance of payments deficit allowed 
maintenance of an overvalued currency (see Khan, 1986 and Balassa, 1986). 
The question of how the real exchange rate responds to shocks, both domestic and 
external, in developing countries has recei~ed increasing attention in the last few years. 
Earlier studies, for example, Khan (1986) have tended to concentrate on movements in 
the equilibrium real exchange rate. However, a study by Khan and Montiel (1987) takes 
the debate further by incorporating a dynamic analysis. This study briefly discusses 
responses of the real exchange to a variety of exogenous and policy induced shocks in 
a small, primary-commodity-exporting country. The analysis shows that the real 
exchange rate will respond differently to different types of shocks, and in certain 
instances, the short run will not necessarily be the same as the long run response. In 
some instances, an external shock such as a debt crisis could result in real exchange rate 
overshooting, i.e., the real exchange rate depreciated beyond its long run equilibrium 
level. 
The discovery of diamonds in the early 1980's caused the real exchange rate of the Pula 
to appreciate as the relative price of non-traded goods sectors rose. The government 
responded by devaluing the currency so as to remain competitive. This is in contrast to 
Nigeria which experienced a substantial appreciation following an oil boom and in 
42 
response imposed quantitative import controls. Similarly, in response to the oil boom in 
the late 1970's and 1980's Trinidad and Tobago resorted to a policy of protection by 
imposing high tariffs on imported goods in order to shield domestic import-competing 
industries from the effects of the appreciation of the real exchange rate induced by the 
rise in the price of oil. 
Botswana authorities have always feared that the appreciation of the Pula will harm non-
mining export sectors which were mostly labour intensive. Therefore, the government 
adopted a more conservative fiscal approach by saving a substantial amount of "diamond 
revenue" abroad. This strategy has helped Botswana authorities to avoid excessive 
government's spending and avoid real exchange rate misalignment. It is argued that the 
policy response (i.e., devaluation) by Botswana yielded positive results as the import-
competing industries continued to sustain output and employment. This is in contrast to 
the policy response (i.e., the expansion of import protection) in the case of Trinidad and 
Tobago which " ... further exacerbated the loss of competitiveness because protection 
causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate" (Tokarick, 1995:50). 
In the face of balance of payments shocks, foreign exchange reserves can serve as a 
cushion or "shock absorber" to ease the transition and facilitate adjustment. This is true 
of both negative and positive shocks. As mentioned above, the reduction in exports is 
likely to cause overappreciation of the real exchange rate if there is no necessary 
adjustment of allowing the local currency to depreciate. 
4.4 Shocks Experienced in Botswana since 1976 
4.4.1 The 1981 External Shock, Balance of Payments Crisis and Response to the Shock 
Following the end of the fixed exchange rate of the Pula to the US dollar and the 
subsequent pegging of the Pula to a basket of currencies that was half SDR in mid 1980, 
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a recession in developed countries owing to the second oil shock in the early 1980s led 
to a collapse of demand in world diamond markets and the imposition of a quota on 
Botswana's diamond sales by the Central Selling Organisation (CSO). This resulted in 
Botswana experiencing a balance of payments shock due to large declines in the value 
and volume of diamonds. However, the level of foreign reserves fell by 22 3 between 
April and December 1981, down to 4 months of import cover. By March 1982, there 
was a further decline qf foreign exchange reserves to P198 million, or only 3,5 months 
of cover for that years' s imports of P680 million. 
Following the 1981 shock, adjustment measures were adopted including, inter alia: a 
10% Pula devaluation in 1982; successive increases in the prime lending rate from 9% 
to 14,5 3; imposition of a ceiling of 8 3, subsequently raised to 15 % , on commercial 
bank credit expansion to the private sector; and a public sector salary freeze. As a result, 
there was a sharp drop in liquidity in the banking sector. The Government also started 
to draw down P32 million on an Eurodollar loan.in May 1982. However, the cushion 
provided by foreign exchange reserves and temporary support achieved through 
Government borrowing reduced the severity of the above adjustment measures. 
In addition, the above measures were relaxed in 1983 due to the fact that the shock was 
temporary. This occurred as a result of a partial recovery in diamond exports as the 
world economy picked up and the easing of the quota. Botswana also benefitted as 
diamond production increased when the new Jwaneng diamond mine came into operation. 
However, since 1982 the balance of payments has been in surplus each year as a result 
of high mineral export earnings, which were not eroded by growth of imports, as well 
as increased earnings on foreign exchange reserves, and some capital flows. 
4.4.2 The 1992 External Shock, Domestic Pressures and Response to the Shock 
A decade after the 1981 crisis, a second demand shock threatened as the CSO imposed 
quotas in 1992. This time, however, foreign exchange reserves and government cash 
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balances were substantial, with the former representing over two years of import cover 
for imports. The shock was milder than the earlier one; the trade balance deteriorated, 
but not enough to cause a trade deficit as had been the case in 1981. 
The adjustment measures adopted as part of the National Development Plan (NDP) 
included cutting subsidies and a broadening of tax and other sources of revenue in order 
to increase fiscal income. The monetary policy stance also shifted towards securing 
positive real interest rates in the early 1990s. 
Between late 1988 and mid 1990, real Pula appreciation against the Rand allowed for 
some of the excess demand from the rapid growth in expenditure to be absorbed by 
cheaper imports. During this period there was an increase in imports partly due to major 
construction projects such as the railway and township construction for the soda ash. 
4.5 Some of the Lessons Regarding Policy Responses to Shocks 
4.5.1 Adjustment to Shocks 
The experiences following the 1981and1992 balance of payments shocks do indicate that 
adjustment to shocks can be a painful process. It could even be more severe if the shock 
takes too much time to subside and/or is permanent. However, effecting these adjustment 
measures is a very vital process. It is this capacity to adjust exchange rate, monetary and 
fiscal policies in response to macroeconomic imbalances that has helped Botswana to 
avert chronic balance of payments difficulties that have hit many developing countries. 
It is also noted that the occurrence of the second shock coincided with the existence of 
adequate foreign exchange reserves (20 months of import cover) which allowed 
authorities some flexibility in implementing adjustment packages and mitigating the 
painful effects of these adjustment packages. This is in contrast to the implementation of 
adjustment measures during the first shock which was not easy as there was not enough 
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foreign exchange reserves (only 4 months of import cover). 
However, shocks are likely to occur again and Botswana's choice in restoring 
macroeconomic balance depends either on its ability to minimise instability against the 
Rand or against the major currencies, but not against both. 
Adjusting to both adverse as well as positive shocks poses problems. Depreciation will 
result in build-up of foreign reserves which ultimately can be used to settle debt or act 
as a buffer against future adverse shocks. However, the real danger is that current 
account surpluses will undermine absorption of resources implying that consumption and 
investment are lower than they would otherwise be. This is a problem that is currently 
confronting Botswana. The massive current account surpluses have not in anyway led to 
investment but in fact, the opposite has been the case. Balassa and Williamson warn that, 
"this policy (massive current account surpluses) may well prove unsustainable because 
of the build-up of inflationary pressures, but, even if these are contained, it does not 
constitute an efficient allocation of resources" (Balassa & Williamson, 1987:69). This 
point is also raised by Dornbusch (1988) who argues that it is a very poor development 
strategy to run current account surpluses in order to finance private capital abroad. 
Instead, the focus of development policy should be to promote investment locally than 
investment abroad. What is critical here is why use devaluation when an economy 
already has an undervalued exchange rate? 
4.5.2 Productive Investment 
Like other developing countries, channelling funds into productive investment has proved 
difficult in Botswana. This scenario is put succinctly by the Bank of Botswana wp.en it 
says "[s]ince the early 1980s, too little of the annual drawdown on mineral revenues has 
been translated into productive investment in either human or physical capital: a 
significant portion was spent on consumption rather than on investment activities, 
redudng annual capital formation below the level that could have occurred" (Bank of 
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Botswana Annual Report, 1994:45). 
The message of this is that the development challenge facing policy makers in Botswana 
is to identify the country's investible resources and those it can attract from abroad and 
commit these same resources to productive investment. The need for other sources of 
economic growth outside minerals would require a high rate of private investment both 
local and foreign and ensure that such production will be sustainable. It could be argued 
that given the large balance of payments surpluses, the current exchange rate is 
undervalued. 
4.5.3 The Dutch Disease 
A conscious development strategy with the primary aim to diversify the economy and 
supported by an appropriate exchange rate policy was decisive in preventing the 
occurrence of the Dutch Disease. Most mineral rich economies experiencing a boom tend 
to succumb to the Dutch Disease. The Dutch Disease manifests itself in the following 
way: "[a]s the boom proceeds, the booming sector expands and draws away resources 
from other sectors of the economy, usually other traded, import-:competing sectors and 
some nontraded sectors, as these sectots must contract to free inputs to the booming 
sector ... The newfound wealth translates into increased spending on all goods, and this 
spending effect will increase the prices of nontraded goods, introducing an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate and a loss of competitiveness ... " (Tokarick, 1995:49). 
However, the NDP provided a good guidance as to how resources could be utilised to 
meet pressing needs as well as the objectives while accumulating enough foreign reserves 
and Government cash balances so as to minimise disruptions when shocks occurred. 
4.5.4 The Role of Supportive Policies 
Policy measures such as real devaluation can only be effective in improving 
competitiveness of domestic export sector if it is not offset by upward domestic price and 
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cost pressures. Therefore, there is a need for a complementary role for both fiscal and 
monetary policies if real devaluation is to be successful. 
Notwithstanding the above, the exchange rate can influence competitiveness only in the 
short run. In the long run, competitiveness of Botswana's traditional exports will be 
determined by the magnitude of the changes in the fundamental factors such as real wage 
levels, the productivity of labour and capital and the availability and prices of inputs. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Responding to shocks can be a painful process especially if the shock takes time to 
subside. Adjustment to these shocks require fiscal and monetary restraint to control both 
public and private consumption. Countries should choose whether to borrow abroad or 
to seek to increase exports and cut imports. However, if the shock is permanent and 
adjustment continues to be postponed, eventually the foreign reserves run out 
precipitating current account d~ficits, growing foreign debt and a loss in international 
competitiveness (due to real exchange rate appreciation). As we have argued earlier, 
some countries especially in Asia were successful in adjusting to shocks than most 
African countries. In the latter, these adjustments which were implemented together with 
bad macroeconomic policies worsened the situation like real exchange rate appreciation 
leading to a loss in international competitiveness. 
Two major shocks occurred since 1976 one was in 1981 due to balance of payments 
crisis and another one in 1992 as a result of the imposition of quotas by the CSO. In the 
former, the cushion provided by foreign exchange reserves reduced the severity of the 
shock while in the latter case the Government resorted to cutting subsidies and a 
broadening of tax and other sources of revenue. 
The experiences following the 1.981and1992 balance of payments shocks do indicate that 
adjustment to shocks can be a painful process. The process is even more severe if the 
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shock is permanent. In the case of Botswana, due to prudent monetary and fiscal policies, 
adjusting to shocks has helped to avert chronic balance of payments difficulties like 




The exchange rate performs a dual role in small open economies. These objectives are 
to support a competitive real exchange rate and to serve as nominal anchor for low 
inflation. Therefore, the conduct of an exchange rate policy is determined to a larger 
extent by the relative weight attached to each objective depending on the prevailing 
circumstances. 
In contrast to many developing countries, authorities in Botswana have had little need to 
use exchange rate exclusively for balance of payments purposes given the impressive 
level of foreign exchange reserves. However, the slow growth of the economy in the past 
two years require more emphasis on a coherent strategy of diversification than ever 
before. Such a strategy would require the use of appropriate trade and competitive 
exchange rate policies in order to stimulate the exporting and import substituting sectors. 
The major problem is that inflation in Botswana continues to exceed that of South Africa. 
Therefore, any attempt to devalue the domestic currency in order to boost exporting and 
import substituting sectors will result in an increase in inflation. In this regard therefore, 
it is not surprising that for a long time the exchange rate policy has been used to achieve 
price stability because inflation in Botswana is dominated by South Africa's inflation and 
Rand/Pula rate. It was also noted that notwithstanding the strong import prices and hence 
the exchange rate on Botswana prices, the exchange rate could not be a sole policy 
instrument for controlling inflation. Other domestic pressures, for example, an 
increasing cost of utilities also contribute to rising inflation. 
From 1976 until 1982 the objective of the exchange rate policy was to maintain price 
stability by reducing imported inflation as indicated by a 5 % level of appreciation three 
times during the period. Following a balance of payments crisis in 1982, there was a 
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shift of policy as the emphasis was now on the stimulation of exporting and import 
substituting sectors as opposed to maintaining price stability. Therefore, there was a 103 
devaluation in May 1982. Four years later, a new basket with a reduction in the weight 
of a Rand in the Pula basket was introduced following an appreciation of the US dollar 
to counter anticipated inflationary upsurge in South Africa. However, the Pula continued 
to appreciate precipitating a 5 % level of devaluation three times between 1989 and 1991. 
In 1993, the rate of inflation began to stabilise and the real exchange rate stabilised too. 
By the end of 1994, the rate of inflation was below that of South Africa for the first time 
in a decade. Initially the exchange rate policy was weighed in favour of maintaining price 
stability. Recently, there has been a shift of policy to support a competitive real exchange 
rate in order that domestic manufacturers are able to compete in regional markets. 
In Botswana, in particular, owing to the small size of the market, concentration of the 
retail and wholesale trade in a few hands and overdependence on imports, it is very 
difficult to manipulate nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument. It is also important 
to note that until inflation is reduced to levels of that of its trading partners, the 
distinction between real and nominal exchange rate is crucial. However, a stable real 
exchange rate does not mean that an export-oriented strategy will succeed. It simply 
contributes to a more stable and predictable environment for exporters about movements 
of relative prices so as to avoid production decisions based on false expectations. A 
successful export-oriented strategy will be determined jointly by appropriate industrial 
and trade policies. 
Responding to shocks can be a painful process especially if the shock is permanent. 
Adjustment to these shocks require prudent fiscal and monetary J?Olicies. If the shock is 
permanent and adjustment continues to be postponed, eventually the foreign reserves run 
out which result in current account deficits. Botswana experienced two major shocks all 
relating to balance of payments crisis. The first shock occurred in 1981 and was due to 
a recession owing to the oil shock in the early 1980' s leading to depressed diamond 
markets. Following the imposition of the quota by the CSO, the second shock occurred 
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in 1992. 
The analysis shows that Botswana has been quite successful in responding to exogenous 
shocks. Botswana's strong foreign exchange reserve position as well as prudent 
monetary and fiscal policies have enabled it to respond quite effectively to the two past 
shocks. However, it would be erroneous to think that these responses would be adequate 
when new and even more adverse shocks strike again in the future. Policy makers 
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